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AUTOMATION 
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Abstract: Existing technologies can already automate most work functions, and 
the cost of these technologies is decreasing at a time when human labor costs are 
increasing. This, combined with ongoing advances in computing, artificial 
intelligence, and robotics, has led experts to predict that automation will lead to 
significant job losses and worsening income inequality. Policy makers are 
actively debating how to deal with these problems, with most proposals focusing 
on investing in education to train workers in new job types, or investing in social 
benefits to distribute the gains of automation.  
The importance of tax policy has been neglected in this debate, which is 
unfortunate because such policies are critically important. The tax system 
incentivizes automation even in cases where it is not otherwise efficient. That is 
because the vast majority of tax revenue is now derived from labor income, so 
firms avoid taxes by eliminating employees. More importantly, when a machine 
replaces a person, the government loses a substantial amount of tax revenue—
potentially trillions of dollars a year in the aggregate. All of this is the unintended 
result of a system designed to tax labor rather than capital. Such a system no 
longer works once the labor is capital. Robots are not good taxpayers. 
We argue that existing tax policies must be changed. The system should be at 
least “neutral” as between robot and human workers, and automation should not 
be allowed to reduce tax revenue. This could be achieved by disallowing 
corporate tax deductions for automated workers, creating an “automation tax” 
which mirrors existing unemployment schemes, granting offsetting tax 
preferences for human workers, levying a corporate self-employment tax, or 
increasing the corporate tax rate. We argue the ideal solution may be a 
combination of these proposals.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
An automation revolution is underway.1 Current technologies can already mechanize most 
work activities, and the cost of these technologies is decreasing at a time when human labor costs 
are increasing.2 On top of that, ongoing and exponential improvements in computing, artificial 
intelligence, and robotics are permitting automation in an ever increasing number of fields.3 As a 
result, academic and industry experts are widely predicting that automation will result in 
substantial “technological unemployment” in the near future.4 For instance, the McKinsey Global 
                                                 
1 Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Robot Revolution—Global Robot & AI Primer (2015) 
<www.bofaml.com/content/dam/boamlimages/documents/PDFs/robotics_and_ai_condensed_primer.pdf> (“The pace 
of disruptive technological innovation has gone from linear to parabolic in recent years. Penetration of robots and 
artificial intelligence (AI) has hit every industry sector, and has become an integral part of our daily lives. Technology 
has also expanded beyond routine work, and moved into complex problem-solving, and replicating human perception, 
tasks that only people were capable of.”). “The word ‘automation’ was coined by Delmar S. Harder, then executive vice 
president of the Ford Motor Co., in attempting to describe the latest kind of assembly line technique involving engine-
block transfer machines then being installed at Ford’s River Rouge and Cleveland plants.” United States Congress. 
Senate. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. Nation's manpower revolution. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Employment and Manpower of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, Eighty-eighth 
Congress, first session, relating to the training and utilization of the manpower sources of the Nation Part 5, at 1659 
(1963); for a definition of the term “automation” see: Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of Automation Law: Tying Policy 
Knots with Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 77, 84 (2015) (“Broadly, automation 
includes all the ways computers and machines help people perform tasks more quickly, accurately, and efficiently. The 
term “automation” refers to: (1) the mechanization and integration of the sensing of environmental variables through 
artificial sensors, (2) data processing and decision making by computers, and (3) mechanical action by devices that apply 
forces on the environment or information action through communication to people of information processed. The term 
encompasses open-loop operations and closed-loop control as well as intelligent systems.”) (citations omitted); One of 
the most cited studies on technological unemployment claims that 47% of American jobs are at high risk of loss due to 
automation. Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How susceptible are Jobs to 
Computerisation? Oxford Martin Programme on Technology and Employment, Sept, 2013 (reporting that 47% of 
American workers are at high risk of automation and stating that, “recent developments in machine learning will put a 
substantial share of employment, across a wide range of occupations, at risk in the near future.”). 
2 JAMES MANYIKA, ET AL., HARNESSING AUTOMATION FOR A FUTURE THAT WORKS (2013) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works> 
(predicting that fewer than 5 percent of occupations could be entirely automated with existing technologies); see also 
Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 
41 (2013) <www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/future-of-employment.pdf.>. 
3 For examples of automation in white-collar and professional settings, see, e.g., Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning is 
Already Changing Your Life, Fortune, Sept. 28, 2016, http://fortune.com/ai-artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-
learning/. Of particular concern to future attorneys, artificial intelligence is already automating work functions in the 
legal services industry. See, e.g., Jane Croft, Legal firms unleash office automatons, Financial Times, May 16, 2016, 
<https://www.ft.com/content/19807d3e-1765-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d> (discussing various software programs that 
can outperform attorneys and paralegals in document review). Cf. Dana Remus and Frank S. Levy, Can Robots Be 
Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, Dec. 30, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2701092> 
(arguing that artificial intelligence will refocus rather than replace attorneys). 
4 Supra note 1. In the 1930s, the economist John Maynard Keynes popularized the term “technological unemployment” 
to refer to “unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour outrunning the pace at 
which we can find new uses for labour.” John Maynard Keynes, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1930) at 358-373. 
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Institute has claimed the disruption caused by artificial intelligence will, “happ[en] ten times faster 
and at 300 times the scale, or roughly 3,000 times the impact” of the Industrial Revolution.5 We are 
entering an era in which the combined impact of technological improvements in many different 
areas is going to be profoundly transformative—and disruptive.6 
Automation has the potential to create widespread benefits. Not only will automation 
increase productivity, it will improve safety and lead to new scientific breakthroughs.7 But without 
oversight, automation will also exacerbate unemployment and economic inequality.8 Even if 
workers rendered technologically unemployed are able to transition to new jobs, as has been the 
case during previous eras of rapid change, there will still be significant short term disruptions. 
Moreover, many experts are predicting that today’s technological advances are different in kind 
from those of the past, and that large scale permanent increases in unemployment are inevitable.9 In 
1990, the three largest companies in Detroit with a combined market capitalization of $36 billion 
                                                 
5 JAMES MANYIKA, ET AL., DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ADVANCES THAT WILL TRANSFORM LIFE, BUSINESS, AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013) (predicting also $6 trillion in economic impact by 2025 from advanced robotics, 3D printing 
and autonomous vehicles). 
6 See, e.g., HERRING KAGERMANN, ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIC INITIATIVE 
INDUSTRIE 4.0: FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIE 4.0 WORKING GROUP (2013) at 5 (“The first three industrial 
revolutions came about as a result of mechanisation, electricity and IT. Now, the introduction of the Internet of Things 
and Services into the manufacturing environment is ushering in a fourth industrial revolution.”); see also, Vernor Vinge, 
The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era (1993) <www-
rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html> (the article which coined the term “Singularity” to refer to the 
argument that, “we are on the edge of change comparable to the rise of human life on Earth. The precise cause of this 
change is the imminent creation by technology of entities with greater than human intelligence.”)  
7 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability (2016) 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2877380> (discussing the potential of automation to result in substantial safety benefits, for 
instance in the transportation industry); see also, Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the 
Future of Patent Law. 1079 B. C. Law Rev. 1083–1091 (2016) (discussing examples in which artificial intelligence has 
generated patentable subject matter under circumstances in which the computer rather than a person has qualified for 
inventorship). 
8 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technological Committee on Technology, PREPARING FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) at 2. 
9 Klaus Schwab and Richard Samans, The Future of Jobs, Preface (2016) <reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-
2016/preface/>; see also Brian Dorini, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the 
Post-Market Era, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 231 (1995) reviewing Jeremy Rifkin, THE END OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE 
GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET ERA (1995) 233 (“The ranks of the unemployed are 
swelling with former service sector workers, such as secretaries, receptionists, clerks, and cashiers. These workers are 
being replaced by what Rifkin calls the silicon-collar workforce: answering machines, scanners, voice and handwriting 
recognition devices, electronic mail, and inventory control and monitoring devices.”) Id at 136–43. 
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employed 1.2 million workers.10 In 2014, the three largest companies in Silicon Valley with a 
combined market capitalization of $1.09 trillion employed 137,000 workers.11 
These are not new problems.12 In 1962, President Kennedy stated, “I regard it as the major 
domestic challenge, really, of the sixties, to maintain full employment at a time when automation, 
of course, is replacing men.”13 His solution was to pass the nation’s first and most sweeping federal 
program to train workers unemployed due to technological advances.14 More recently, in 
December, 2016, the Executive Office of the President issued a report which outlined a three-
pronged policy response to automation and artificial intelligence (AI): namely, to (i) “[i]nvest in 
and develop AI for its many benefits”, (ii) “[e]ducate and train Americans for jobs of the future”, 
and, (iii) “[a]id workers in the transition and empower workers to ensure broadly shared growth”.15 
These and other proposals for dealing with automation have focused on improving education and 
improving social benefit systems. Concerns about technological unemployment have even breathed 
new life into an old social benefit proposal—guaranteed minimum income.16  That could involve 
the government’s making fixed payments to each of its citizens regardless of their circumstances.17 
                                                 
10 M. Chui and J. Manyika, Digital era brings hyperscale challenges. Financial Times Aug. 13, 2014. 
11 Id.  
12 See generally, Forbes, John Douglas, SOME EVIDENCES OF TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN ANCIENT ATHENS 
AND ROME (1932). For instance, the Roman Emperor Vespasian once refused to use a labor saving transportation 
machine, famously stating, “You must allow my poor hauliers to earn their bread.” Steve Welch, The real political 
divide is education, Tech Crunch, Dec. 30, 2016, <https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/30/the-real-political-divide-is-
education/>. 
13 John F. Kennedy, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT’S NEWS CONFERENCE 
OF FEBRUARY 14, 1962 (1962) at 135.  
14 Gladys Roth Kremen, MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, United States 
Department of Labor (1974) <www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-mdtatext> (describing the law’s origins). 
Also of note, a year earlier, the Office of Automation and Manpower was created at the Department of Labor to anticipate 
technological change and create occupational guidance. General Order, April 20, 1961, Hist. Ofce.; Press Release, April 
20, 1961, Hist. Ofce. For extensive reviews of automation issues in the 1960s, see generally, Office of Manpower. James 
L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1968) p. 77. 
15 Executive Office of the President, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016) at 3. 
16 It was proposed during the Industrial Revolution by Charles Fourier, and then later Joseph Charlier, before being 
adopted by John Stuart Mill. Philippe Van Parijs, A Basic Income for All, Boston Review (2000) 
<bostonreview.net/forum/ubi-van-parijs>. Mill proposed, “a certain minimum is first assigned for the subsistence of 
every member of the community, whether capable or not of labour.”Id. 
17 Stevens at 373 (“One of the most commonly considered government payout schemes is what is referred to as a basic 
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Both education and social benefit reforms to deal with automation would require significant 
financial support. 
While there has been a lively public discourse on technological unemployment and income 
disparity, the automation debate has historically ignored the issue of taxation. That has very 
recently started to change. On February 16, 2017, the European Parliament rejected a proposal to 
impose a “robot tax” on owners to fund support for displaced workers, citing concerns of stifling 
innovation.18 The next day, Bill Gates stated that he thought government should tax companies’ use 
of robots to slow the spread of automation and to fund other types of employment.19 While these 
are promising developments, the current discourse has not adequately appreciated the importance 
of tax policies on automation. 
The current taxation system encourages automation by providing employers with 
preferential tax treatment for robot workers. Automation allows firms to avoid employee and 
employer wage taxes levied by Federal, state, and local taxing authorities. It also permits firms to 
claim accelerated tax depreciation on capital costs for automated workers, and it creates a variety 
of indirect incentives for machine workers.  All of this is the unintended result of a tax system 
designed to tax labor rather than capital. Tax policies may thus result in automation in some cases 
in which a firm would otherwise choose a human worker.  
                                                 
income guarantee. Generally speaking, Basic Income Guarantee is a monetary government-backed and issued guarantee 
such that all adults have access to an amount of money necessary to meet basic needs.”). President Richard Nixon also 
once proposed a guaranteed basic income of about $10,000 in today’s dollars for families of four. This proposal, the 
Family Assistance Plan, passed through the House before it was voted down by Senate Democrats. Whitney Mallett, The 
Town Where Everyone Got Free Money, Motherboard, Feb. 4, 2015 <motherboard.vice.com/read/the-mincome-
experiment-dauphin>. 
18 Reuters, European parliament calls for robot law, rejects robot tax. Feb 16, 2017. 
19 Kevin Delany, The robot that takes your job should pay taxes, says Bill Gates, Quartz, Feb. 17, 2017 (“Exactly how 
you’d do it, measure it, you know, it’s interesting for people to start talking about now.”). 
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Even more concerning, automation significantly reduces the government’s tax revenue 
since most tax revenue comes from labor income.20 When firms replace employees with machines, 
the government loses revenue. As a very rough estimate, the revenue loss can be estimated by 
multiplying an effective tax rate by the gross salary loss due to automation. In January 2017, the 
McKinsey Global Institute claimed that about half of current work activities could be automated 
using currently demonstrated technologies, which would eliminate $2.7 trillion in annual wages. 
Workers pay high effective tax rates ranging from 25% to 55% when all tax types are taken into 
account.21 This suggests that worker automation could result in trillions of dollars lost per year in 
tax revenue at various levels of government.22  
In the United States and most other developed nations, the bulk of taxes are currently 
remitted by workers either through wage withholding, income taxation of labor income, or indirect 
taxation of workers as consumers.23  Since robots are not subject to these types of tax regimes, 
automation reduces the overall tax base.  Robots are simply not taxpayers, at least not to the same 
extent as human workers. If all workers were to be replaced by machines tomorrow, most of the tax 
base would immediately disappear.  As a matter of taxation, automated workers represent a type of 
                                                 
20 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), The Budget for Fiscal Year 2015, Historical Tables, p. 32-33 
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist.pdf>; Internal Revenue Service, Data Book 
Statistics <www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Collections-and-Refunds,-by-Type-of-Tax-IRS-Data-Book-Table-1>; 
Congressional Budget Office, The Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes, 2010 (December 2013) 
www.cbo.gov; see also Lester Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax: Taking 
the Tax Law “Private” Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 1 (1996). 
21 Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by Income Level, 145 TAX NOTES 117 (2014). 
22 JAMES MANYIKA, ET AL., HARNESSING AUTOMATION FOR A FUTURE THAT WORKS (2013) (predicting that fewer than 5 
percent of occupations could be entirely automated with existing technologies); see also Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael 
A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 41 (2013) 
<www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/future-of-employment.pdf>. 
23 OECD Revenue statistics <stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV>; see also OECD Release of April 11, 2017 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxing-wages-20725124.htm (calculating a “tax wedge” of an average of 36% as the level of 
wage taxation minus a hypothetical amount of value received by working families).  The OECD’s tax policy analysis of 
wage taxation is constrained by the lack of a calculation of the “tax wedge” for other types of taxation, such as corporate 
taxation, thus rendering the policy analysis only a comparison of apples to oranges.  For example, corporate taxpayers 
also received value in the form of government contracts and so forth and the OECD does not attempt to calculate these 
benefits.  Furthermore, the term “tax wedge” is a misnomer as that term normally refers to a deadweight loss of income 
taxation and not an offset for certain types of taxation in the form of benefits received by a select group of taxpayers. 
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capital investment, and capital income is taxed at much lower rates than labor income.24 This is not 
accidental; it is based on the historic belief that the taxation of labor income is more efficient than 
the taxation of capital income. This concept is discussed in tax policy analysis as the “tax 
incidence” of capital taxation.25   
Tax is thus critically important to the automation debate. Tax policies should not encourage 
automation unless it is part of a deliberate strategy based on sound public policy. We believe the 
solution is to adjust the tax system to be at least neutral as between robot and human workers.26 
More ambitiously, changes to tax policies are necessary to account for the loss of government tax 
revenue due to automation. This is particularly critical because the education and social benefit 
reform necessitated by automation will only be possible with more, not less, tax revenue.  
This article outlines several potential tax policy solutions to address the automation 
revolution. Tax “neutrality” between human and automated workers could be achieved by 
disallowing corporate tax deductions for automated workers, creating an “automation tax” which 
mirrors existing unemployment schemes, granting offsetting tax preferences for human workers, 
levying a corporate self-employment tax, and increasing the corporate tax rate. The advantage of 
tax “neutrality” as between human and automated workers is that it permits the marketplace to 
adjust without tax distortions. Firms may then elect to automate if it will be more efficient without 
                                                 
24 The term “capital taxation” refers here to corporate income taxation.  For a comparison of effective tax rates between 
US and EU multinationals see: Reuven Avi-Yonah, R. & Y. Lahav, The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest U.S. and EU 
Multinationals, 65 TAX LAW REV. 375 (2012). 
25 In a strange twist of economic theory, the ultimate cost of wage taxation paid by workders is generally thought to be 
borne by capital.  See Arnold Harberger, Tax Policy in a Small, Open Developing Economy, in “The Economics of the 
Caribbean Basin” (M. B. Connolly ed., 1985); For the extension of the ´small open economy´ model beyond the small 
open economy context see A. Lans Bovenberg, Capital Income Taxation in Growing Open Economies, (1986) 31 J. POL. 
ECON. 347; Anne Sibert, Taxing Capital in a Large, Open Economy, 41 J. POL. ECON. 297 (1990); Alan Auerbach, Who 
Bears the Corporate Tax: A Review of What We Know, 20 TAX POLICY & ECONOMY 1 (2006). 
26 Meisel at 226 (“There are other alternatives using the tax code.  One option suggested by Martin Ford in The Lights 
in the Tunnel is modification of the payroll tax, a tax that discourages hiring people and encourages automation since it 
makes the use of people more expensive.  He suggests a reform of the tax system where we get away from taxing based 
on workers to reduce the disincentive to hiring.”) citing Martin Ford, The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating 
Technology and the Economy of the Future (New York: Createspace, 2009).   
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taking taxes into account. Since the current tax system favors automated workers, a move toward a 
“neutral” tax system could increase the appeal of human workers.  Policy solutions could even be 
implemented to make human workers more appealing than machines in terms of tax costs and 
benefits to the extent policy makers choose to discourage automation.   
The remainder of this article is divided into three parts. Part II discusses the phenomenon of 
automation and provides historical background on efforts to deal with its harmful effects. Part III 
analyzes current tax policies and contends that they promote automation even where it would not 
otherwise be efficient. Finally, Part IV argues that changes to tax policy are needed to prevent the 
unintended consequences of encouraging automation and to offset the government’s loss of tax 
revenue. We provide several potential solutions for achieving these goals, and argue the ideal 
solution is a mix of changes to tax policy.  
The increased tax revenue from our proposal could be used to provide improved education 
and training for workers rendered unemployed by robots and computers. Should the pessimistic 
prediction of a near future with substantially increased unemployment due to automation manifest, 
these taxes could also support social benefit programs such as a guaranteed minimum income. 
Automation will likely generate more wealth than has ever been possible. It should not come at the 
expense of the most vulnerable.  
II. THE PROBLEM WITH AUTOMATION  
Automation is Coming 
Experts are widely predicting that automation is going to have a substantial impact on 
employment even in the near term. Bank of America Merrill Lynch argues that by 2025, AI may 
eliminate $9 trillion in employment costs by automating knowledge work.27 A report by the World 
                                                 
27 Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Robot Revolution—Global Robot & AI Primer (2015) 
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Economic Forum estimates that automation could result in the net loss of 5.1 million jobs by 
2020.28 The consulting firm Deloitte claims that 35 percent of jobs in the United Kingdom are at 
high risk of redundancy due to automation in the next 10 to 20 years.29 The McKinsey Global 
Institute has stated that 51 percent of existing work activities could be automated using existing 
technologies.30  This is due to a combination of factors: improvements in automation technologies, 
decreased costs for such technologies, and increased labor costs.31 Whereas it was previously 
possible to automate a large number of work processes, it has now become practicable. As 
automation technologies continue to both improve and decrease in cost, it is difficult to think of 
work functions that will not eventually be susceptible to automation.32 
The Good 
Automation increases productivity which generates value and creates wealth.33 Partly due to 
technological advances and automation, the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has steadily risen 
                                                 
<www.bofaml.com/content/dam/boamlimages/documents/PDFs/robotics_and_ai_condensed_primer.pdf> (noting also 
that AI will yield $14–33 trillion in annual economic impact) 
28 See, Klaus Schwab and Richard Samans, The Future of Jobs, Preface (2016) <reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-
2016/preface/>. 
29 Deloitte, Agiletown: the relentless march of technology and London’s response (2014) 
<www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/uk-futures/london-futures-agiletown.pdf> 
30 JAMES MANYIKA, ET AL., HARNESSING AUTOMATION FOR A FUTURE THAT WORKS (2013) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/digital-disruption/harnessing-automation-for-a-future-that-works>; see also 
Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 
41 (2013) <www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/future-of-employment.pdf.>. 
31 See supra notes 27–30.  
32 See, Ryan Abbott, Hal the Inventor: Big Data and its Use by Artificial Intelligence. In Big Data is Not a Monolith, 
MIT Press (Hamid Ekbia, et al., eds.) (2016) at 188–191 (noting the ways in which automation technologies could 
replace workers in the pharmaceutical sciences).  
33 See generally, Joel Mokyr, Chris Vickers, and Nicolas L. Ziebarth, The History of Technological Anxiety and the 
Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different? 29(3) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 31–50 (2015) 
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from $1.37 trillion in 1960 to $73.5 trillion in 2015.34 Despite academic criticism, GDP has 
remained the dominant economic indicator of welfare and standard of living for half a century.35 
Automation can also create new jobs.36 Human workers may be needed to build and 
maintain automation technologies. Automation may free up capital for investments in new 
enterprises, result in the creation of new products, or decrease production costs for existing 
products which may result in lower prices and thus greater consumer demand, all of which may 
increase employment. Technological advances have also upgraded the labor force: automation has 
historically reduced the need for unskilled workers but increased the need for skilled workers.37 For 
instance, some of today’s most in-demand occupations did not exist even five years ago.38  
The Bad 
Automation can cause under- and un-employment. While worker productivity has risen 
robustly since 2000, employment has stagnated. This may be due in part to technological 
advances.39 When McDonald’s introduces computer cashiers, the company saves money and 
consumers may enjoy lower prices.40 But human cashiers now find themselves in a more 
                                                 
34 The World Bank, GDP (current US$), World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files 
<data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>; see also, Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, TECHNOLOGY 
AT WORK: THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT (2015) at 11 
<www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work.pdf>. 
35 See, e.g., Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh, The GDP paradox, 30(2) Journal of Economic Psychology 117–135, 117 
(2009) (“Gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary, market value of all final goods and services produced in a 
country over a period of a year. The real GDP per capita (corrected for inflation) is generally used as the core indicator 
in judging the position of the economy of a country over time or relative to that of other countries. The GDP is thus 
implicity, and often even explicitly, identified with social welfare—witness the common substituting phrase ‘standard of 
living’. . . For over half a century now, the GDP (per capita) has been severely criticized as not adequately capturing 
human welfare and progress. All the same, the GDP has maintained a firm position as a dominant economic indicator…”). 
36 The following arguments were referred to as “compensation theory” by Karl Marx, who argued none of these effects 
were guaranteed. Jon Elster, Karl Marx A Reader (1986) at 81. 
37 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Automation and Technological Change, Hearing before a subcommittee 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955) p. 14. 
38 See, Klaus Schwab and Richard Samans, The Future of Jobs, Preface (2016) <reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-
2016/preface/>. 
39 See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY 
IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) at 139.  
40 See, Ted Goodman, Fight for $15? McDonald’s To Place Automated Ordering Stations At All US Locations, The Daily 
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competitive labor market. The enhanced competition may result in lower wages, less favorable 
employment terms, fewer working hours, reduced hiring, or layoffs.41 As the former CEO of 
McDonald’s USA famously quipped, “it’s cheaper to buy a $35,000 robotic arm than it is to hire an 
employee who’s inefficient making $15 an hour bagging French fries…”42 McDonald’s is now 
expanding its use of automated cashiers throughout the United States and in other countries.43    
Also, while automation generates wealth, it does so unevenly. Over the past 25 years, partly 
due to automation technologies, the income share of the top 0.1% has increased substantially.44 
Productivity increases have outpaced wage increases, and median household income has held 
steady even as the GDP has gradually risen.45 Increased automation is likely to accelerate this 
trend. The White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) has predicted that future automation 
                                                 
Caller, Nov. 18, 2016, <dailycaller.com/2016/11/18/fight-for-15-mcdonalds-to-place-automated-ordering-stations-at-
all-us-locations/>. Standard economic principles suggest that in a competitive market lower business costs will result in 
lower consumer prices. See, e.g., Arthur A. Thompson, Jr., Strategies for Staying Cost Competitive, Harvard Business 
Review, 62(1) (1984), 110–117. In fairness, fast food automation has been around since the 19th Century. Angelika Epple, 
The “Automat”. A History of Trechnological Transfer and the Process of Global Standardization in Modern Fast Food 
around 1900, 7(2) Food & History 97–118 (2009) (discussing the restaurant chain “Automat” which opened its first 
location in 1986, and noting, “One of its highly unique selling features around 1900 was that no waiters were to be seen 
in the guest room. The Automat of that time was—at first sight—operated by vending machines only. ‘You absolutely 
help yourself’ was one of its most prominent marketing slogans.” Id at 99. The Automat’s technology transferred around 
the U.S. and Europe and eventually developed into the world’s largest restaurant chain: Horn & Hardart. Id at 97.  
41 See, Simon Neville, McDonald’s ties nine out of 10 works to zero-hours contracts, The Guardian, Aug. 5, 2013, 
<www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/05/mcdonalds-workers-zero-hour-contracts> (noting that 90% of 
McDonald’s UK workers have no guaranteed hours); see also, Stephanie Strom, McDonald’s Introduces Screen 
Ordering and Table Service, The New York Times, Nov. 17, 2016, 
<www.nytimes.com/2016/11/18/business/mcdonalds-introduces-screen-ordering-and-table-service.html> (reporting the 
cost of purchasing and installing eight touch order screens is $56,000).  
42 Julia Limitone, Fmr. McDonald’s USA CEO: $35K Robots Cheaper Than Hiring at $15 Per Hour, Fox Business, May 
24, 2016 <www.foxbusiness.com/features/2016/05/24/fmr-mcdonalds-usa-ceo-35k-robots-cheaper-than-hiring-at-15-
per-hour.html>. He further claims that a $15 minimum wage results in $30,000 a year for a full-time employee.  
43 Ed Rensi, The Ugly Truth About A $15 Minimum Wage, Forbes, Apr. 25, 2016, 
<www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/04/25/mcdonalds-minimum-wage-reality/#2c7fa78058bb>. Automated cashiers 
are already the “norm” in European countries with high labor costs, and McDonalds is now experimenting with self-
serve McCafe kiosks. Id. 
44 Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael Osborne, TECHNOLOGY AT WORK: THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
(2015) at 7 <www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/reports/Citi_GPS_Technology_Work.pdf>. 
45 See, e.g., Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY 
IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) at 139. 
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will disproportionately affect lower-wage jobs and less educated workers, causing greater 
economic inequality.46   
Higher unemployment coupled with growing income inequality is a recipe for social unrest. 
Worsening inequality exacerbates conflicts and reduces social cohesion.47 As Physicist Stephen 
Hawking has warned, “[e]veryone can enjoy a life of luxurious leisure if the machine-produced 
wealth is shared, or most people can end up miserably poor if the machine-owners successfully 
lobby against wealth redistribution. So far, the trend seems to be toward the second option, with 
technology driving ever-increasing inequality.”48 
The Ugly 
One of automation’s most pronounced, and unappreciated, effects relates to taxes. Under 
the current tax system, automation produces a substantial reduction in tax revenue. Most of the 
U.S. government’s tax revenue comes from taxes on workers.49 By stating that most tax revenue 
comes from workers, we refer to the aggregate amount of wage tax, income tax and indirect taxes 
levied on income or wages derived from work at all levels of government.  Much of the prior tax 
policy debate focuses solely on income taxation by the Federal government.  Of course, a 
substantial portion of income subject to Federal income tax arises from work and falls within our 
definition of worker taxation.  However, the tax policy debate has been misleading since wage 
taxes are also levied on labor income and comprise more than 1/3rd of Federal remittances.  
Likewise, indirect state taxes are levied on workers.  Consequently, by replacing employees with 
                                                 
46 Executive Office of the Presidnet Naitonal Science and Technological Committee on Technology, PREPARING FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE at 2 (2016). 
47 Oxfam, Wealth: Having it All and Wanting More, Jan. 2015 <policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/wealth-
having-it-all-and-wanting-more-338125>. 
48 Akshat Rathi, Stephen Hawking: Robots aren’t just taking our jobs, they’re making society more unequal, Quartz, Oct. 
9, 2015 <qz.com/520907/stephen-hawking-robots-arent-just-taking-our-jobs-theyre-making-society-more-unequal/> 
49 Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2015, Historical Tables, p. 32-33 
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2015/assets/hist.pdf>. 
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machines, the government loses out on employee and employer wage taxes levied by Federal, state, 
and local taxing authorities. In addition, tax revenue may be further reduced from businesses 
claiming accelerated tax depreciation on capital outlays for machines and from other tax incentives 
related to indirect taxation, such as sales tax or value-added tax (VAT) exemptions.50  
History of the Automation Scare 
Fears of the consequences of automation have been expressed since the industrial 
revolution.51 In 1772, the writer Thomas Mortimer objected to machines, “which are intended 
almost totally to exclude the labor of the human race.”52 In 1821, the economist David Ricardo 
argued that automation would result in inequality, and that, "substitution of machinery for human 
labour is often very injurious to the interests of the class of labourers . . . [It] may render the 
population redundant and deteriorate the condition of the labourer.”53 In 1839, the philosopher 
Thomas Carlyle more poetically wrote, “[t]he huge demon of Mechanism smokes and thunders, 
panting as his great task, in all sections of English land; changing his shape like a very Proteus; and 
infallibly, at every change of shape, oversetting whole multitudes of workmen, as if with the 
waving of his shadow from afar, hurling them asunder, this way and that, in their crowded march 
and course of work or traffic; so that the wisest no longer knows his whereabout[s].”54 
                                                 
50 See Part III, infra. 
51 For that matter, broader social issues related to automation have been discussed about since Aristotle’s time. See, e.g., 
Johannes Hanel, ASSESSING INDUCED TECHNOLOGY: SOMBART'S UNDERSTANDING OF TECHNICAL CHANGE IN THE 
HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (2008) at 91 (noting Aristotle’s hope that machines could occupy the place of slaves in a utopian 
society.) 
52 Thomas Mortimer, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF COMMERCE, POLITICS AND FINANCES (1801) at 72. 
53 David Ricardo, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1821) at 283–284. “I am convinced, that 
the substitution of machinery for human labour, is often very injurious to the interests of the class of laboure.” Id. 
54 Thomas Carlyle, The Works of Thomas Carlyle (2010) at 142. Thomas Carlyle called the Industrial Revolution, “a 
mechanical age.” Id. Carlyle wrote that technology was causing a “mighty change” in their “modes of thought and feeling. 
Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand.” Id. 
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The Industrial Revolution even gave birth to a social movement and group, protesting the 
use of new technologies: the Luddites.55 Luddites were primarily English textile workers who 
objected to working conditions in the 19th Century. They believed that automation threatened their 
livelihoods, and they were opposed to the introduction of industrial machinery.56 Some Luddites 
engaged in violent episodes of machine breaking, in response to which the English government 
made machine-breaking a capital offense.57  
The Luddite Movement died out, but automation concerns persisted throughout the 20th 
century, often flaring during times of rapid technological progress.58 For instance, the debate was 
revitalized in the 1950s and 1960s with the widespread introduction of office computers and 
factory robots.59 In his 1960 election campaign, John F. Kennedy suggested that automation 
offered, “hope of a new prosperity for labor and a new abundance for America,” but also that it 
“carries the dark menace of industrial dislocation, increasing unemployment, and deepening 
poverty.”60  
Despite these concerns, technological advances have often resulted in overall job creation. 
The computer eliminated jobs, but created jobs for working with information created by computers. 
The automobile eliminated jobs, but created jobs in the motel and fast-food industries. The tractor 
and other agricultural advances eliminated jobs, but drove job growth in other areas of the 
                                                 
55 See, Richard Conniff, What the Ludites Really Fought Against, Smithsonian Magazine, Mar. 2011 
<www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-the-luddites-really-fought-against-264412/?page=2>. 
56 The National Archives, Luddites <www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/politics/g3/>. 
57 Id.; see also, Richard Conniff, What the Ludites Really Fought Against, Smithsonian Magazine, Mar. 2011 
<www.smithsonianmag.com/history/what-the-luddites-really-fought-against-264412/?page=2>. The “Luddite fallacy” 
now describes the fear that innovation will have long term harmful labor effects. Id. 
58 In 1924, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi wrote, "What I object to, is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such. 
The craze is for what they call labour-saving machinery. Men go on 'saving labour', till thousands are without work and 
thrown on the open streets to die of starvation." Mohandas K. Gandhi, ALL MEN ARE BROTHERS (1958) at 121.  
59 See, Gladys Roth Kremen, MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, United 
States Department of Labor (1974) <www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-mdtatext> (“The dawn of the Atomic 
Age had witnessed the implementation of a new technology that threatened to replace men with machines.”); see also, 
Douglas A. Irwin, OFFSHORING OF AMERICAN JOBS (2009) at 79. 
60 Douglas A. Irwin, OFFSHORING OF AMERICAN JOBS (2009) at 80. 
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economy.61 In 1900, 41 percent of the workforce was employed in agriculture.62 In 2000, less than 
2 percent of the employed labor force worked in agriculture.63 Yet this has not translated to a 39% 
increase in unemployment. Even as agricultural-based employment and agriculture’s relative 
contribution to the GDP decreased, the productivity of farmworkers skyrocketed and agriculture’s 
absolute contribution to the GDP increased.64 Indeed, in each era when concerns have been 
expressed about automation causing mass unemployment, technology has created more jobs than it 
has destroyed. 
Is This Time Different? 
The automation debate is resurfacing with a vengeance, due to recent advances in artificial 
intelligence and other automation technologies. Once more, prognosticators have divided into two 
camps: the optimists who claim there will be a net creation of jobs, and the pessimists who predict 
mass unemployment and growing inequality.65  
History favors the optimists.66 They argue that technological advances will generate 
widespread benefits together with overall job creation. They also argue that current unemployment 
                                                 
61 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME 
OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES (2014) at 176. 
62 Carolyn Dimitri, Anne Effland, and Neilson Conklin, The 20th Century Transformation of U.S. Agriculture and Farm 
Policy, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Jun. 2005) at 2. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. Alston, Julian M., et al. Persistence pays: US agricultural productivity growth and the benefits from public R&D 
spending. Vol. 34. Springer Science & Business Media, 2009. 
65 Klaus Schwab and Richard Samans, The Future of Jobs, Preface (2016) <reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-
2016/preface/>; see also Brian Dorini, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the 
Post-Market Era, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 231 (1995) reviewing Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the 
Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era (New York: New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995) 233 (“The 
ranks of the unemployed are swelling with former service sector workers, such as secretaries, receptionists, clerks, and 
cashiers. These workers are being replaced by what Rifkin calls the silicon-collar workforce: answering machines, 
scanners, voice and handwriting recognition devices, electronic mail, and inventory control and monitoring devices (pp. 
136-43).”). 
66 See John Maynard Keynes, ESSAYS IN PERSUASION (1930) at 358-373 (predicting at the combination of 
technological innovation and capital accumulation will eventually solve the problem of material needs). 
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may relate more to globalization and offshoring than to technology, and that any future 
technological unemployment would be, “only a temporary phase of maladjustment.”67 
But there is reason to think that this time may be different.68 Computers are improving 
exponentially, and there are fewer limits to what they can do than ever before. Computers can 
replace low skilled workers and manual laborers as well as white collar workers and professionals 
in a variety of fields. Computers are already working as doctors, lawyers, artists, and inventors.69 
All of this is occurring at a time when labor costs are rising and computer costs are declining. In 
2012, Vinod Khosla, the co-founder of Sun Microsystems, predicted that diagnostic software 
would take the jobs of 80% of physicians in the next 20 years.70  
While the optimists and pessimists disagree about automation’s effects on long term 
unemployment, both agree it causes short-term job losses and industry specific disruption. During 
previous times of rapid technological change, it took decades to develop new worker skill sets on a 
significant scale and to build new job markets.71 Although the Industrial Revolution ultimately 
resulted in net job creation, it also involved periods of mass unemployment and human suffering. 
                                                 
67 See Id.; see also, John Stuart Mill, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848) at 97.  
68 Yvonne Stevens, The Future: Innovation and Jobs, 56 Jurimetrics J. 367, 368–9 (2016) (“This time there may be some 
distinctions requiring widespread and perhaps novel solutions, unlike other periods in history.”). 
69 Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning is Already Changing Your Life, Fortune, Sept. 28, 2016 <http://fortune.com/ai-
artificial-intelligence-deep-machine-learning/>. Jane Croft, Legal firms unleash office automatons, Financial Times, 
May 16, 2016, <www.ft.com/content/19807d3e-1765-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d (discussing various software programs 
that can outperform attorneys and paralegals in document review). Cf. Dana Remus and Frank S. Levy, Can Robots Be 
Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice of Law, Dec. 30, 2015, available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2701092 (arguing that artificial intelligence will refocus rather than replace attorneys). 
Yonghui Wu, et al., Google’s Neural Machine Translation System: Bridging the Gap between Human and Machine 
Translation, Sept. 26, 2016, available at <arxiv.org/abs/1609.08144. Google now claims its Google Neural Machine 
Translation system is approaching human-level translation accuracy. Id. 
70 Vinod Khosla, Do We Need Doctors or Algorithms? Tech Crunch, Jan. 10, 2012, 
<techcrunch.com/2012/01/10/doctors-or-algorithms/>. 
71 Klaus Schwab and Richard Samans, The Future of Jobs, Preface (2016) <reports.weforum.org/future-of-jobs-
2016/preface/>. 
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In the Automation Revolution, whether there are detrimental long term effects, there will almost 
certainly be significant short term disruptions.72 
Automation Social Policy  
It is important that policy makers act to ensure that automation benefits everyone. Our 
policy goal should be to accommodate and even encourage advances that promote economic value, 
while redistributing benefits to those negatively affected. During the Industrial Revolution, John 
Stuart Mill wrote that while automation would ultimately benefit laborers, “this does not discharge 
governments from the obligation of alleviating, and if possible preventing, the evils of which this 
source of ultimate benefit is or may be productive to an existing generation [and] there cannot be a 
more legitimate object of the legislator's care than the interests of those who are thus sacrificed to 
the gains of their fellow-citizens and of posterity.”73 Or, as the U.S. National Science and 
Technology Council Committee on Technology argued in 2016, “Public policy can address these 
risks, ensuring that workers are retrained and able to succeed in occupations that are 
complementary to, rather than competing with, automation. Public policy can also ensure that the 
                                                 
72 For example, a substantial number of transportation workers are likely to be displaced by self-driving vehicles, and 
about three percent of the population is employed in the transportation industry. See, Richard Henderson, Industry 
Employment and Output Projections to 2024, Monthly Labor Review, Dec. 2015; see also, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011 Census Community Profiles 
<http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_services/getproduct/census/2011/communityprofile/0?opendocument&nav
pos=220>. Tesla, for example, plans to make all its vehicles self-driving. BBC News, Tesla to Make All Its New Cars 
Self-Driving, Oct. 20, 2016 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37711489>. Tesla is only one of many companies 
developing such technologies. CB Insights, 33 Corporations Working on Autonomous Vehicles, Aug. 11, 2016, 
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/autonomous-driverless-vehicles-corporations-list/; see also, CB Insights, Investment 
Into Auto Tech On Pace To Break Annual Records, Jul. 14, 2016 <https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/auto-tech-
funding-h1-2016/>. Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, has even claimed that self-driving cars will be so much safer than 
human drivers, that there will need to be a future ban on human driving. Stuart Dredge, Elon Musk: Self-Driving Cars 
Could Lead to Ban on Human Drivers, The Guardian, Mar. 18, 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/18/elon-musk-self-driving-cars-ban-human-drivers> 
73 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with some of their Application to Social Philosophy, (1909) at Book 
I, Chapter VI, Paragraph 13. 
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economic benefits created by AI are shared broadly, and assure that AI responsibly ushers in a new 
age in the global economy.”74 
Efforts to alleviate the harms and share the benefits of automation have focused on 
education and social benefits. As mentioned earlier, in December 2016, the Executive Office of the 
President then under Barack Obama issued a report which outlined a three-pronged policy response 
to AI and Automation: namely, to (i) “[i]nvest in and develop AI for its many benefits”, (ii) 
“[e]ducate and train Americans for jobs of the future”, and, (iii) “[a]id workers in the transition and 
empower workers to ensure broadly shared growth”. In terms of education, it is thought that 
technologically unemployed workers need training (or retraining) to transition to new job types. 
Historically in the U.S., numerous government and industry programs have been enacted to combat 
technological unemployment with education.75 The nation’s first and most sweeping federal 
training program, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, was signed into law by 
President Kennedy to train workers unemployed due to technological advances and automation.76 
More recently, President Obama provided billions of dollars to fund worker training in part to 
address technological unemployment.77 More ambitiously, he proposed a plan to make two years of 
                                                 
74 Executive Office of the Presidnet Naitonal Science and Technological Committee on Technology, PREPARING FOR THE 
FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2016) at 2. 
75 Of particular interest, “the Armour Meat Packing Company created a special “automation fund” for retraining 
purposes. The company paid a 14-cent levy into the fund, established in 1959, for every 100 tons of meat shipped, up to 
$500,000, to pay for retraining operations.” <www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-mdtatext. 
76 Gladys Roth Kremen, MDTA: The Origins of the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, United States 
Department of Labor (1974) <www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-mdtatext>. Also of note, a year earlier, the 
Office of Automation and Manpower was created at the Department of Labor to anticipate technological change and 
create occupational guidance. General Order, April 20, 1961, Hist. Ofce.; Press Release, April 20, 1961, Hist. Ofce. For 
extensive reviews of automation issues in the 1960s, see generally, 
<onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=United%20States.%20Office%20of%20Manpower%2
C%20Automation%20and%20Training>. Elliot Aronson, Office of Manpower, Automation and 
Training: Unemployment and retraining; an annotated bibliography of research (1965); see also James L. Sundquist, 
POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS (1968) at 77. 
77 See, The While House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: President Obama Proposes New ‘First Job’ 
Funding to Connect Young Americans with Jobs and Skills Training to Start Their Careers, Feb. 4, 2016 
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/04/fact-sheet-president-obama-proposes-new-first-job-funding-
connect-young.  
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community college free for “responsible students” in his 2015 State of the Union Address, although 
this proposal was never adopted.78 It remains to be seen how President Trump and the current 
Republican Administration will address these issues. 
 As the third prong of President Obama’s 2016 strategy report notes, social benefit 
investments are also critical. The report advocates strengthening the social safety net through 
greater investments in programs such as unemployment insurance and Medicaid. It also proposes 
the creation of new programs for wage insurance and emergency aid.79 In addition, it argues for 
building a 21st century retirement system, expanding health care access, and increasing worker 
bargaining power.80  
Revitalized concerns about technological unemployment have breathed new life into an old 
social benefit proposal—guaranteed minimum income.81  The basic idea is that the government 
would provide a fixed amount of money to its citizens regardless of their situation. This has been 
implemented numerous times on a relatively small scale, most recently in Finland.82 In 2017, 
Finland began a pilot program to give about $600 per month to 2,000 unemployed citizens, with no 
other requirements.83 Proponents argue this will reduce unemployment, poverty, and disincentives 
for the unemployed to work (as under conventional unemployment schemes recipients generally 
                                                 
78 John Morgan, Barack Obama free community college plan backed by $100m funding, Times Higher Education, Apr 
27, 2016 <www.timeshighereducation.com/news/barack-obama-free-community-college-plan-backed-by-one-hundred-
million-dollar-funding>. 
79 Executive Office of the President, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016) at 3.  
80 Id.  
81 It was proposed during the Industrial Revolution by Charles Fourier, and then later Joseph Charlier, before being 
adopted by John Stuart Mill. Philippe Van Parijs, A Basic Income for All, Boston Review, Obt. 1, 2000 
<bostonreview.net/forum/ubi-van-parijs>. Mill proposed, “a certain minimum is first assigned for the subsistence of 
every member of the community, whether capable or not of labour.”Id. 
82 Whitney Mallett, The Town Where Everyone Got Free Money, Motherboard, Feb. 4, 2015 
<motherboard.vice.com/read/the-mincome-experiment-dauphin>. 
83 Kevin Lui, Finland is Giving Nearly $600 a Month to 2,000 Jobless Citizens, No Questions Asked, Fortune, Jan. 3, 
2017 <amp.timeinc.net/fortune/2017/01/03/finland-universal-basic-income-experiment/?source=dam>. It is also worth 
noting, that the U.S. has operated a guaranteed basic income since 1999. The Alaska Permanent Fund pays each person 
who has lived the past year in Alaska $1,680. Philippe Van Parijs, A Basic Income for All, Boston Review, Obt. 1, 2000 
<bostonreview.net/forum/ubi-van-parijs>. 
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lose their unemployment benefits after returning to work). It might also encourage education by 
providing support for a period of training. Critics have argued that a guaranteed minimum income 
will encourage recipients to remain unemployed and discourage additional education. In any case, 
Finland plans to eventually replace earnings-based insurance benefits with a basic income.84 Y 
Combinator, the Silicon Valley startup incubator, has plans to launch a similar private program in 
Oakland, California.85 
Improving education and social benefit systems will not be easy. Liberals and conservatives 
alike can agree on the desirability of improving worker training as it will enlarge the productive 
labor force, but “[d]elivering this education and training will require significant investments.”86 
Enhancing the social benefit system will also require significant investment, but such a goal is even 
more challenging because liberals and conservatives generally disagree that enhanced benefits are a 
desirable aim.87 
That automation creates a need for greater government investment is well known, but what 
has so far been largely ignored in the automation debate is that automation will make it far more 
difficult for the government to make investments once tax revenues are reduced. 
                                                 
84 Kevin Lui, Finland is Giving Nearly $600 a Month to 2,000 Jobless Citizens, No Questions Asked, Fortune, Jan. 3, 
2017 <amp.timeinc.net/fortune/2017/01/03/finland-universal-basic-income-experiment/?source=dam>. 
85 Chris Weller, The inside story of one man’s mission to give Americans unconditional free money, Business Insider 
UK, Jun. 27, 2016 <uk.businessinsider.com/inside-y-combinators-basic-income-project-2016-6?r=US&IR=T>. 
86 Executive Office of the President, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE ECONOMY (2016) at 3.  
87 Stevens at 373 (“One of the most commonly considered government payout schemes is what is referred to as a basic 
income guarantee. Generally speaking, Basic Income Guarantee is a monetary government-backed and issued guarantee 
such that all adults have access to an amount of money necessary to meet basic needs.”). President Richard Nixon once 
proposed a guaranteed basic income of about $10,000, adjusted for inflation, for families of four. This proposal, the 
Family Assistance Plan, passed through the House before it was voted down by Senate Democrats. Whitney Mallett, The 
Town Where Everyone Got Free Money, Motherboard, Feb. 4, 2015 <motherboard.vice.com/read/the-mincome-
experiment-dauphin>. 
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III. CURRENT TAX POLICIES FAVOR AUTOMATION  
Introduction 
Worker automation is often thought of as a matter of efficiency, where efficiency refers to 
the ratio of useful output to total input.88 For example, if a machine and a person create the same 
output, but the machine is less expensive, then automation generates cost savings and improves 
efficiency.89  If a robot costs a firm $40,000 a year and a human worker costs $45,000 a year, with 
both workers producing the same output, the firm would yield a $5,000 annual cost savings by 
automating.  
However, it may also be the case that the robot costs more than a human worker before 
taxes, and only becomes cheaper on a post-tax basis. For instance, the capital outlay for the robot, 
which includes money spent to acquire, maintain, repair, or upgrade fixed or capital assets such as 
robots, together with the costs for operating the robot (electricity, etc.), might be estimated at 
$50,000 over some period, whereas the wages and other costs associated with an employee 
(healthcare, retirement funding, etc.) might be $45,000 over the same period. The fact that the 
robot may be associated with tax benefits that do not apply to human workers may reduce the cost 
of the robot to $40,000. A firm using a rational cost-based decision model would choose to 
automate and realize the machine’s tax benefit. In this example, tax policy has rendered the robot a 
more efficient worker. In simple terms, the heavy relative taxation of the living worker drives the 
firm toward automation to generate a tax savings.   
                                                 
88 Expressed mathematically, efficiency “r” is equal to the amount of useful output (“P”) divided by the amount (“C”) 
of resources consumed: r=P/C. 
89 Stevens at 373 (“Technology is very attractive to owners of capital. Machines require no pay, benefits, sick leave, 
vacation, lunch breaks, or weekends off. They are less prone to err and are more productive than human beings. In a race 
for the same job, it is therefore difficult for humans to compete with machines.”). 
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The tax system is not “neutral” as between work performed by robots versus people.90 
Automation provides several major tax advantages. These include avoidance of employee and 
employer wage taxes levied by Federal, state, and local taxing authorities, benefits from claiming 
accelerated tax depreciation on capital costs for automated workers, and indirect incentives for 
machine or automated workers. Any outputs produced by human labor are thus effectively 
penalized under the tax system compared to outputs produced by capital.91 In fact, as described 
below, automated workers are taxed less than human workers at both the employer and employee 
level. 
Avoiding Employee and Employer Wage Taxes Via Automation 
Wage taxes as discussed here are levied solely on wages paid to individuals to fund social 
benefit programs including social security, Medicare and Medicaid. Presently in the United States, 
the employer and employee pay matching amounts totaling 12.4% of an employee’s salary, plus 
matching Medicare payments totaling 2.9% (applied on the first $127,200 of earnings), plus an 
additional 0.9% Medicare surcharge (applied on earnings over $200,000).92  Many states and 
localities also levy wage taxes that apply in addition to the Federal levies.93   
                                                 
90 The analysis of the “neutrality” of taxation is a common practice in the field of taxation.  See Peggy Richman 
(Musgrave), Taxation of Foreign Investment Income: An Economic Analysis (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1963) in Peggy Musgrave, “Tax Policy in the Global Economy”, Selected Essays (Elgar, 2002) (introducing the term 
“capital export neutrality”).  
91 William Meisel, The Software Society, Cultural and Economic Impact (New York: Trafford, 2013), 220 (“An 
automation tax described as a payroll tax on computers conveys the basic concept.  It helps level the playing field.  The 
automation tax serves two purposes: (1) it provides an incentive for a company to create jobs by means such as investing 
in human-computer synergy; and (2) it proves governmental revenues that, properly used, can create more consumption 
and thus boost the economy.”). 
92 Internal Revenue Code §§3101(a), §3111(a); §3102(a); §3111(a); §3121(a)(1); Internal Revenue Service, 
<www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc751.html>; see also Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Employment Tax Gap, 20 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 127, 132 (2009) (“The tax imposed by FICA has two components. The first is the old-age, survivors, and 
disability insurance component, often referred to as OASDI… that constitute “wages” from employment. One half of the 
tax is deducted from the employee’s compensation. The employer pays the other half. This component of the FICA tax 
is earmarked to cover social security benefits. There is a limit on the amount of wages that can be taxed…The contribution 
and benefit base is adjusted each year to reflect increases in average wages of the U.S. economy.”).  
93 For an explanation of the US states that levy sales taxes, see, Scott Drenkard and Nicole Kaeding, State and Local 
Sales Tax Rates in 2016, Tax Foundation, Mar. 9, 2016 <taxfoundation.org/article/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-2016>. 
For an explanation of EU tax policy including the VAT, see, European Parliament (2015), “Tax Policy in the EU” 
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Tax Benefit from Accelerated Tax Depreciation on Capital Outlays for Automated Workers 
 Tax depreciation refers here to the deduction (a reduction in the tax base) claimed by the 
firm in respect to capital outlay for automated workers.  Deductions for capital outlays for robotic 
equipment will allow the firm to reduce its tax base over time, which reduces the amount of tax 
that is payable. Of course, wages paid to individuals are also tax deductible, but the timing of the 
deduction works differently for robot and human workers, and this may have a significant effect on 
a firm’s tax burden.  
An accelerated tax deduction means that the deduction may be claimed earlier than its 
actual economic depreciation (the reduction in the value of an asset over time).94 For example, 
assume a robot has a total capital cost of $100,000 and 7 years of useful life, while an employee 
has a total wage cost of $100,000 over 7 years. If accelerated depreciation for capital is available,95 
the firm may be able to claim a large portion of the $100,000 depreciation as a tax deduction in 
year 1 rather than pro-rata over 7 years.96  For instance, the firm might claim tax depreciation for 
an automated worker of $50,000 in year 1, $30,000 in year 2, $10,000 in year 3, and in diminishing 
amounts to year 7. By contrast, wage taxes must be deducted as paid (i.e., 1/7th in each year).  In 
                                                 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/.../2015/.../EPRS_IDA(2015)549001_EN.pdf. 
94 Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 
493, 494-5, 499 (2007) (“Accelerated depreciation policy can be traced back to an influential 1953 paper by Evsey 
Domar… [T]he Harrod-Domar model, predicting that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was proportional to the number 
of machines; namely, that investment is the key to growth… A later model, developed by Noble Laureate Robert Solow 
between 1956-57, points out that the Harrod-Domar model cannot explain sustained growth. Solow showed that as capital 
per worker increases, the marginal productivity of capital declines until the capital-labor ratio approaches a steady-state 
level. At that point, savings… are just sufficient to replace worn out machines and equip new workers (assuming 
population growth), so productivity growth is zero.”) citing Evsey D. Domar, Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and 
Employment, 14 ECONOMETRICA 137 (1946); Roy F. Harrod, An Essay in Dynamic Theory, 49 ECON. J. 14 (1939); but 
see Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow, 
Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957). 
95 Margalioth at 505 (“For tax reporting purposes, the Code allows the use of much more accelerated depreciation 
methods than the straight-line method.”). 
96 Id. at 505 (“The vast majority of U.S. corporations use a depreciation method called ‘straight-line’ for financial 
reporting purposes. According to the straight-line depreciation method, annual depreciation is calculated by subtracting 
the salvage value of the asset from the purchase price and dividing this number by the estimated useful life of the asset. 
The outcome is equal periodical deductions throughout the asset’s useful life. If the asset in the above example is 
depreciated under the straight-line method, its $1000 cost is allocated uniformly over its useful life period of five years, 
resulting in $200 of depreciation deduction each year.”). 
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this case, a present value benefit will accrue from claiming accelerated tax deductions for 
automated workers relative to the pro-rata tax deductions for employee wages, even where the 
$100,000 capital outlay is paid up-front.97 This is possible because the present value of the 
accelerated tax deduction on capital investment is greater than the discounted value of the return 
the firm could make by investing the free cash held on its balance sheet. 
Tax depreciation (whether accelerated or not) is also generally available even where the 
actual rate of inflation is equal to or greater than the economic depreciation.98 Inflation here refers 
to the rate at which the general level of prices for goods and services is rising such that it would 
cost more to build the same robot next year than it costs today.  The issue becomes significant 
where, as in the prior example, it was presumed for tax purposes the robot wears out after 7 years, 
but it turns out the robot actually increases in nominal value rather than wearing out.  An 
incremental tax benefit thus accrues where the rate of inflation is higher than the rate of the actual 
diminishment in economic value, and where the nominal (or inflationary) difference is never 
recaptured in the tax system.  In the corporate setting this recapture of tax book to inflation 
difference would only accrue on the disposal of the asset, which rarely occurs.  The same principle 
applies to commercial real estate, where tax depreciation is allowable on an asset that is actually 
increasing (not decreasing) in nominal value over time, and the difference is not adjusted for tax 
purposes.    
                                                 
97 Most large corporations have significant cash accumulations and do not need to borrow funds (and pay interest) to 
make capital expenditure on automation.  Notably, if corporate borrowing is required to fund capital expenditure, then 
the present value calculation gets more difficult since the interest paid will also be tax deductible, however interest will 
become payable.  In summary, accelerated tax depreciation yields an economic benefit where the firm has balance 
sheet cash earning a low rate of return which it can instead deploy to yield tax deductions on an accelerated basis. 
98 Margalioth at 508 (“In times of inflation, recovery of the nominal cost of investment is not sufficient to match income 
and expenses. Because of inflation, the income generated by the asset is expressed in a larger number of dollars though 
it has the same purchasing power.”). 
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Finally, firms can use accounting “tricks” to report a tax benefit to earnings due to 
automation, which they may want to do for a variety of reasons, such as making the company look 
more attractive to potential investors. Where tax depreciation is accelerated relative to book 
depreciation (the amount reported on financial statements), a firm may generally claim a profit (or 
earnings benefit) to reported earnings from the tax benefit.99  Thus, a large corporation enjoys a 
book benefit to reported financial earnings from the differential in depreciation periods.  Any firm 
seeking to accelerate reported earnings could use automation to achieve such a timing benefit.  This 
increase to reported earnings may be an even more significant motivation for large firms to 
automate than a cash tax savings.  
Indirect Tax Incentives for Automated Workers 
The indirect tax system also benefits automated workers at the firm level.  Indirect taxation 
refers to taxes levied on goods and services rather than on profits; the primary examples are the 
Retail Sales Tax (RST) levied by states and municipalities in the United States and the Value 
Added Tax (VAT) in most other countries. Employers are thought to bear some or all the incidence 
of indirect tax, as worker salaries and retirement benefits must be increased proportionately to 
offset the indirect tax.  In the case of automated workers, however, the burden of indirect taxes is 
entirely avoided by the firm.100  In general, business expenditures for capital assets such as 
machinery are exempt from indirect taxation, or yield a deduction for RST or VAT.101  
                                                 
99 Id. at 505 (“Accounting for depreciation is also required for financial reporting purposes. Generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) require the depreciation of the (depreciable) cost of income generating assets, usually, 
tangible assets. The cost has to be allocated among accounting periods on a systematic and rational basis that reflects the 
use of the asset in the revenue generating process over the asset’s operational life.”). 
100 The capital assets comprising automated workers might be subject to property taxation by some local jurisdictions as 
business personal property.  However, such personal property taxation is often successfully mitigated by tax planning or 
with tax waivers by local jurisdictions and municipalities negotiated by municipalities.  Furthermore, human employees 
also engender some degree of attached personal property (e.g., office fixtures, personal computers) which are also subject 
to personal property taxation.   
101 See John Mikesell, Sales Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Why Shouldn’t Production Exemptions Be 
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Automation Reduces Tax Revenue 
The share of the tax base borne by labor is increasing. It is approximately 3/4ths of the total 
tax base in the United States, and perhaps is significantly greater.102  In the European Union, high 
rates of wage taxation are levied in addition to VAT, which is also thought to burden workers, this 
time in their role as consumers. Moreover, capital taxation is trending sharply downwards in nearly 
all jurisdictions. Corporate taxation now comprises less than 9% of the overall tax base in the 
United States. This is roughly one-half of its respective share compared to prior decades.103  If 
anything, corporate tax rates are predicted to decrease further given the Republican control of both 
houses of Congress and recent political events centered on the tax policy objectives of President 
Trump.104 In Europe, lower taxation of capital is welcomed as a means of international tax 
competition.105  
Worker taxation is different from corporate taxation in several respects. Tax avoidance 
planning is not generally available to wage earners. For instance, an employee cannot use transfer 
pricing techniques to shift earned income into a 0%-taxed entity in the Cayman Islands.  Also, 
wage earnings are not subject to potential deferral, meaning labor income is taxed currently 
whereas capital may be taxed upon future disposition of an asset.  Human capital is also not 
depreciable, so a person does not typically get a tax deduction for education or medical costs, at 
least not up to the full amount of the investment.106 By contrast, machinery or other equipment 
                                                 
General?, 54:3 NAT’L TAX J. 557 (200X) 
102 OMB (2015); Internal Revenue Service, Data Book Statistics www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Collections-and-
Refunds,-by-Type-of-Tax-IRS-Data-Book-Table-1. 
103 See Lester Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law 
"Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1 (1996). 
104 The Trump tax plan calls for a reduction in the corporate tax rate and the partial elimination of deferral on foreign 
earnings of US multinationals, see: Alan Cole, Details and Analysis of the Donald Trump Tax Reform Plan, September 
2016 <taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/TaxFoundation_FF528_FINAL3.pdf>. 
105 Meisel at 223 (“What numbers are used in the ratio of revenues to employees?  I recommend using revenues generated 
within the taxing country and employees within the country in the ratio.”). 
106 For the US incentives with an election for deduction or credit on higher education costs see: Internal Revenue Code, 
Section 25A (Hope and Lifetime Learning Tax Credits). 
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yields an immediate and ongoing tax deduction to a firm until the equipment’s tax basis is reduced 
to zero. Workers are additionally subject to various forms of indirect taxation, particularly in 
Europe and in states or local jurisdictions, whereas business machinery is often exempted from 
RST and VAT.   
If corporate taxes decline as a share of the tax base while the overall level of taxation holds 
constant, other types of taxation may increase to cover the difference.  While a government may 
choose to increase borrowing or decrease spending, over the long term this would be expected to 
have negative economic effects. As a policy goal, worker automation should be engineered to have 
zero-sum effects to the economy, in which the taxation of workers and capital within the workforce 
might be expected to increase as some workers are eliminated and replaced by automation. 
IV. TAX POLICY OPTIONS FOR AN AUTOMATION TAX 
The current tax system is designed to principally tax human workers and not robot workers.  
All else being equal, this creates a situation in which firms prefer robots since substantially less tax 
per output is accrued or remitted in respect of an automated worker.  At the same time, the 
automation of large segments of the labor force threatens long-term fiscal solvency because of the 
potential reduction in tax collections. 
A major automation policy issue is therefore how to adjust the tax system to be at least 
neutral as between robot and human workers. In doing so, it is important to consider that capital 
investment of any kind (including for robots) is thought to be beneficial to economic growth. 
Nations engage in tax competition to draw capital into their jurisdictions. Any disallowance of 
capital deduction would serve as a disincentive to investment and would, theoretically, be 
economically undesirable.  For example, if only one taxing jurisdiction disallowed tax deductions 
for automated workers, multinational firms might shift their capital investments to other 
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jurisdictions.107 It is therefore important to consider economic efficiency in creating an automation 
neutral tax system.108 Several possibilities exist.  
Disallowance of Corporate Tax Deductions for Automated Workers 
A first option is to attempt to disallow the respective corporate income tax deductions for 
capital investment that give rise to the automation tax benefit.  The basic idea is to reverse each of 
the tax benefits accruing in the case of worker automation in relation to avoidance of levy of wage 
taxes, accelerated or timing difference of deductions, and indirect tax benefits.   
To begin with Federal income taxation, the disallowance of tax preferences upon some 
threshold of income level is a common practice in the Internal Revenue Code and is often referred 
to as a “phase-out.”109  In practice, this means that a tax preference is reduced based on some 
eligibility criteria. For instance, student loan interest is deductible, but not for individuals with 
more than $80,000 in modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) ($160,000 for joint filers).110 A new 
code provision could be designed with a similar “phase out,” where depreciation or other expenses 
related to automated workers would be disallowed based on a reported level of automation. For 
example, firms with high levels of worker automation could have their tax depreciation 
automatically reduced beyond a certain threshold. The Treasury Department would need to craft 
                                                 
107 The shift would be from one high-tax jurisdiction to another high-tax jurisdiction to claim the deduction’s full value, 
however, rather than a shift into tax havens with a 0% corporate tax rate, where the capital tax deductions for 
automated workers would not have any value (i.e., the value of a tax deduction in a 0% tax jurisdictions is 0).  Thus, 
multinational firms should not be expected to make capital investment in robots in tax havens where the value of 
deductions is zero, especially where transfer pricing strategies are available to shift income arising from the automated 
workers. 
108 Meisel at 226 (“There are other alternatives using the tax code.  One option suggested by Martin Ford in The Lights 
in the Tunnel is modification of the payroll tax, a tax that discourages hiring people and encourages automation since it 
makes the use of people more expensive.  He suggests a reform of the tax system where we get away from taxing based 
on workers to reduce the disincentive to hiring.”) citing Martin Ford, The Lights in the Tunnel: Automation, Accelerating 
Technology and the Economy of the Future (New York: Createspace, 2009).   
109 See generally Emmanuel Saez, Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? 2 AM. ECON. J. ECON POL’Y 180 (2010). 
110 Internal Revenue Service, Student Loan Interest Deduction <https://www.irs.gov/publications/p970/ch04.html>. 
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detailed regulations and criteria to identify the threshold and to measure the level of automation 
required to trigger the disallowance.  
In respect of indirect taxation, a simpler solution may be possible. Indirect tax preferences 
for capital outlay in respect to automated workers could be disallowed outright at the state level. 
Thus, for example, where the firm attempts to claim an RST/VAT exemption or refund for tax 
payments made on behalf of automated workers, this would not be permitted.  
These measures alone will not be adequate, however, since the disallowance of corporate 
income tax deductions will not adequately address the decline in the wage tax base used to fund 
social insurance benefits.  
Levy of an Automation Tax 
A second option is to levy an incremental Federal “Automation Tax” to the extent workers 
are laid-off or replaced by machines.111  A similar system is in place with respect to unemployment 
compensation in many states where worker lay-offs are tracked and employers are given 
corresponding ratings. Employers must pay into an unemployment insurance scheme based on their 
ratings, so a business which has more layoffs pays more in taxes for unemployment insurance. A 
Federal automation tax could be designed to do essentially the same thing where worker lay-off 
data could be obtained from the states and then used to levy an additional Federal tax to the extent 
the Treasury department determined the lay-offs were due to automation.   
A drawback to the levy of an additional automation tax is that it would essentially increase 
the corporate effective tax rate for many firms, and also increase the relative complexity of the tax 
                                                 
111 For a comprehensive discussion of a “telecommuting tax” see: Michael Kraichal, The Chilling Realities of the 
Telecommuting Tax: Adapting Twentieth Century Policies for Twenty-First Century Technologies, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. 
L. & POL’Y 224 (2015).   
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system. Economic theory suggests that higher rates and added complexity are negatives in terms of 
international tax competition.  Another drawback is that firms might accelerate lay-offs upon 
passage (or debate) of the bill prior to implementation to avoid the tax by reducing the number of 
employees upon the effective date of the law. Accordingly, a retroactive effective date for 
measurement of employment levels for the automation tax would be a practical necessity. 
Grant Offsetting Tax Preferences for Human Workers 
A third option is to attempt to grant offsetting tax preferences for firms that employ human 
workers for each category of tax benefit.  To begin with wage taxation, the tax preference could 
entail a repeal of the employer contributions to the social security and Medicare systems. The result 
would be that both human and automated workers would be exempt for the employer in terms of 
wage taxes—not just automated workers. However, this approach seems unfeasible on political 
grounds in that it would accelerate the insolvency of the social security system.   
In terms of income taxation, an offsetting preference for human workers could be designed 
as an accelerated deduction for future wage compensation expense (i.e., the firm would get an 
accelerated tax deduction) to match the accelerated depreciation for automated workers.  In terms 
of indirect taxation typically levied by the states, the contemplated offset would be for indirect 
taxes not typically levied on wage income. This would constitute an incentive for firms to employ 
human workers.   
Levy of a Corporate Self-Employment Tax 
A fourth option is to increase corporate level taxation for firms that produce outputs without 
using human labor. The additional taxes would be a substitute amount for social security and 
Medicare wage taxes avoided by the firm with automated labor.112  In part, this is the corollary to 
                                                 
112 Meisel at 222-3 (“Returning to the payroll tax analogy, companies that hire fewer people pay fewer payroll taxes.  
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the individual self-employment tax where a small-business owner is required to pay monies into 
the social security system approximating the social security taxes that would be paid on his or her 
own wages deemed to be paid to self. The corporate self-employment tax would be calculated as a 
substitute for what employment taxes would have been on the worker and employer if a human 
worker had continued to perform the work.113  The corporate self-employment tax could be 
calculated based on a ratio of corporate profits to gross employee compensation expense.  If the 
ratio exceeds an amount determined by the Treasury (in reference to industry standards), then back-
up withholding could apply on corporate profits.  The gross amount of the automation tax could be 
designed to match the wage taxes avoided by the firm with automated workers.   
William Meisel has similarly proposed an “automation tax” which he referred to in lay 
terms as a “payroll tax on computers.”114 This would be similar to the corporate self-employment 
tax described here.  Meisel wrote:  
I propose that a national automation tax be based on the ratio of a company’s revenues 
(total sales) to their number of employees… [T]he automation tax should increase as a 
percentage as the revenue-per-employee [ratio] grows, making it more attractive to create 
jobs than to replace them with automation… I prefer applying the percentage to revenues...  
Profits can be manipulated with deductions and other accounting complexities much more 
than revenues.115 
                                                 
The payroll tax in the US helps fund social security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance.  In Europe, payroll taxes 
are even higher than in the US.”). 
113 Meisel at 226 (“The automation tax might encourage companies to prefer productivity improvements achieved by 
using a combination of human and computer capabilities.”). 
114 Meisel at 219 (“If software is to take over many jobs, why not have an income tax on software?  We could perhaps 
think of it as a payroll tax on computers.”). 
115 Meisel at 221-3. 
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Meisel’s “automation tax” differs from our proposed corporate self-employment tax in that the 
former uses a sales ratio as opposed to a profit ratio.  A sales ratio is likely unworkable in practice 
since the tax would prohibitively fall on firms with high sales but low profit margins, such as 
discounted retailers.  Since automation often occurs in the high-tech industry among companies 
with high profit-margins, it seems preferable that a viable “automation tax” using a ratio to 
employee expense should be premised on profits, not sales.  
Increase the Corporate Tax Rate 
A fifth option would be to significantly increase the corporate tax rate in combination with 
our earlier proposals.  The counter-intuitive advantage of this approach is that higher corporate tax 
rates increase the relative value of tax deductions for marginal investment. Marginal investment 
refers to incremental investment made only because of the tax system.116  As one of us has 
explained, “The experienced tax attorney always counsels the client that marginal capital 
investment is tax deductible.”117 Thus, multinational firms may make capital investment into higher 
tax jurisdictions in lieu of tax haven jurisdictions partly to claim tax deductions of relatively higher 
value.  Partly for this reason, for smaller and growing firms that are reinvesting profits back into 
their businesses, the higher rate of corporate tax is not a major disincentive. Ongoing tax 
deductions will substantially reduce the tax base regardless of the ultimate tax rate to be applied.   
The drawbacks to increasing the corporate tax rate are well-known and may be summarized 
as follows. First, the corporate tax rate might be a signal to firms about the tax climate of a 
jurisdiction, so higher tax rates could have a negative psychological effect on capital investment 
decision making.118  Second, accelerated tax deductions would be a stronger automation incentive 
                                                 
116 See Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Tax Paradox of Capital Investment, 33:1 J. TAX’N OF INVESTMENTS 59 (2015). 
117 Id. at 61. 
118 Id. at 60–1 (“Any income tax system is designed initially to favor active investors. This is because no matter how 
high the actual tax rate, it is levied only on what is referred to as “taxable income.” Of course, “taxable income” means 
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with a higher corporate tax rate as the deduction would have greater value.  Third, the increase in 
corporate tax rates would affect all firms even those not engaged in worker automation.  Hence, the 
increase in corporate tax rate option might be viewed as one version of zero-sum analysis, in which 
tax policy is designed not to allow a shift of the tax burden from capital to other taxpayers.  
Further, any increase in corporate tax rates may prompt firms to attempt to shift the tax incidence 
to workers or consumers.119  Finally, increasing corporate tax rates may be politically unfeasible. 
As Meisel notes in an understated fashion: “Corporations might instinctively fight a corporate 
tax.”120 
Issues in Economic Efficiency Relevant to Automation Tax Policy Proposals 
The tax policy analysis developed here comes from the perspective of average effective tax 
rates as opposed to solely marginal rates.121 Any marginal tax rate methodology excludes an 
analysis of taxation relative to the overall share of the tax base.  For example, technology and 
pharmaceutical companies often pay a very low average effective tax rate (e.g., less than 10%) but 
could also be correctly found to simultaneously have a high marginal effective tax rate (e.g., about 
35%).  A corporate taxpayer which pays very little tax relative to its level of taxable income could 
correctly describe its marginal tax rate as “high.”  Further, multinational firms do not engage in tax 
avoidance planning to reduce income which they do not intend to earn.  Accordingly, the last dollar 
of income may nearly always be found to be taxed at a “high” marginal tax rate, even where the 
average effective tax rate is relatively low.122   
                                                 
the amount of profits less deductions. Every tax professional is aware of this feature of an income tax system and counsels 
the client accordingly.”). 
119 Although, firms behave as if they bear the incidence of corporate taxation. Kimberly Clausing, In Search of Corporate 
Tax Incidence, 65 TAX LAW REV. 433 (2012). 
120 Meisel at 225.  
121 The calculation of a marginal tax rate is essentially the theoretical opposite of the calculation of taxation as a 
percentage of the share of the overall tax base.   
122 For example, a firm may have an overall tax rate of 20% on all of its earnings, however, with respect to a hypothetical 
decision of whether to earn incremental income the marginal tax rate might be 35%.    
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Economic models of taxation are typically designed by modeling the hypothetical effects of 
changes in marginal tax rates.123 Marginal tax rates again represent incremental changes to the 
statutory tax rate on the last dollar of income.124 For example, a change in the statutory corporate 
tax rate from 35% to 30% would be reflected in economic models premised on marginal rate 
analysis.  The trouble with this form of economic modeling is that its validity relies on the 
presumption that firm decisions are made based on tax effects on the marginal investment and not 
based on an average.  This approach has major implications for tax policy design as tax cuts to the 
statutory rate are nearly certain to have a marginal effect even where the firm does not pay a high 
tax rate overall. Thus, business and investment decisions are presumed not to proceed at the 
average tax rate for all earned income, but only with respect to incremental tax changes relevant to 
marginal income.   
Other economic modelling proceeds on a marginal effective tax rate basis (i.e., reflecting 
that corporate taxpayers do not pay the statutory rate). For example, the granting of an additional 
deduction for manufacturing activity to corporations could reduce the marginal effective tax rate on 
the last dollar of income from 30% to 27% where the statutory rate is 35%.  By this method, the 
firm would be presumed to make an investment decision based on the average tax rate at the 
margin.  Both approaches are distinguishable from analysis using simply an average effective tax 
rate, which for large corporations is now calculated at approximately 20% (including permanent 
deferrals) and trending downward.125  However, for many tech companies the effective tax rate is 
                                                 
123 For a discussion of marginal tax rates in economic analysis see: David Madden, The Poverty Effects of a ‘Fat Tax’ in 
Ireland, 24 HEALTH ECON. 104, 106 (2015) (“The difficulties associated with non-marginal tax reforms have led a 
number of analysts to concentrate on marginal tax reforms. This approach has the advantage of not requiring estimates 
of individual demand and utility functions.”). 
124 The US Federal statutory corporate tax rate is 35%.  Internal Revenue Code, Section 11.  Various individual US states 
also levy an incremental state level corporate tax.  See <taxfoundation.org/article/state-corporate-income-tax-rates-and-
brackets-2016>. 
125 For effective tax rates on multinational firms including the delay in taxation of foreign earnings for US multinationals 
see: Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rates of U.S. Firms with Permanent Deferral, 145 TAX NOTES 1391 
(2015).   
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below 10%.  At such very low average effective tax rates, it is not clear that economic analysis of 
marginal effects of tax cuts is a realistic method of tax policy analysis. By such methods, 
significant macroeconomic benefits can be posited where corporate effective tax rates are reduced 
from very low levels to even lower levels (e.g., from 2% to 1%), but where it is likely that factors 
other than marginal taxation are likely to drive firm investment decisions.  Also, the positing of 
economic growth from marginal tax cuts does not consider the effect changes in the composition of 
the overall tax base, where the taxation of one factor is substantially reduced, namely capital, and 
the taxation of another factor is increased (or overall borrowing is increased).   
In summary, notwithstanding that the statutory corporate tax rate, or marginal corporate 
effective tax rates, might be correctly described as “high” in the economic theory of taxation, such 
analysis is also subject to a relative or zero-sum form of analysis, where tax cuts for one party are 
transferred as tax increases to another party.  The average effective tax rate on workers is relatively 
“high” where all types of taxation are taken into account.126 The taxation of workers comprises the 
bulk of the tax base in the United States and that of most developed countries.  As workers are 
substituted or replaced by automation, follow-on effects are possible not only from the direct 
reduction in the tax base, but also indirectly where the relative taxes are transferred to other 
workers in the economy.  
Concluding Thoughts 
Automation promises to be one of the great social challenges of our generation. It can 
benefit everyone, or it can benefit the select few at the expense of the many. Which outcome occurs 
may have to do with whether policy makers are prepared to make politically challenging decisions 
about how they choose to deal with automation.  
                                                 
126 See Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by Income Level, 145 TAX NOTES 117 (2014). 
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Tax is a critical component of any automation policy. Existing tax policies both encourage 
automation and dramatically reduce the government’s tax revenue. This means that attempts to 
craft policy solutions to deal with automation will be inadequate if they fail to take taxation into 
account. In 2017, when Bill Gates proposed taxing automation, he noted that, “[e]xactly how you’d 
do it, measure it… it’s interesting for people to start talking about now.” This article has aimed to 
advance that dialogue.  
